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 CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC FINANCING MODES BETWEEN  
CONTRACT TECHNICALITIES AND SHARIAH OBJECTIVES   
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ABSTRACT  
  
Some contemporary Islamic banking and finance practices have raised legal 
controversies that arguably eliminate any substantial differences between them and 
their conventional counterparts. These practices seek their legitimacy from 
adherence to merely contractual requirements in terms of form and structure, far 
from considering and looking into the contractual substance and content. These 
controversial practices of Islamic banks are thought to pose a threat to this emerging 
industry, and they have somehow led to the distortion of the religion in the eyes of 
the discerning public and the non-Muslims. This paper examines, through a 
maqasidi approach, the most controversial financing modes adopted by different 
Islamic financial institutions, and discusses the various justifications provided to 
support their legitimacy. The paper also outlines the prospectus of what constitutes 
a genuine Shariah compatible product.  
 
 
Keywords: Islamic finance, Islamic banking, cash finance, controversial Islamic 
fianance. 
  
  
1. INTRODUCTION  
  
 Islamic banks and financial institutions have developed several financing 
instruments for the purpose of fulfilling the increasingly demanding market needs. 
Such sophisticated market needs were not perceived by the earlier generations of 
Muslim jurists and therefore, those jurists did not feel the need to further develop the 
already established financing instruments.   
  
 However, for developing and structuring the modern modes of finance, 
contemporary Islamic financial institutions have basically relied on the conventional 
financial institutions, which fall back on decades of experience in providing financial 
services. In other words, modern financing modes in the Islamic financial institutions 
were modelled after their conventional counterparts as  
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Islamic financial institutions wanted to emulate, with some modifications, the 
conventional institutions in providing the best financial services.   
  
 In this respect, Shariah, in principle, never objects to benefiting from others’ 
experiences; rather, Islam is a religion that encourages and instructs its followers to 
exchange experiences with, and obtain knowledge from Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. However, the problem arises when we know that interest or riba, which is one 
of the gravest crimes a Muslim may ever commit, constitutes the core of almost every 
conventional financing instrument.  
  
 This is one important thing to bear in mind before embarking on our discussion in 
this paper. Another important thing is the well-known fact that any contract can be 
used to obtain good ends and bad ends. A contract thus is like a tool that one can use 
for different purposes, lawful or unlawful ones. A knife, for example, can be used in 
the kitchen and can be used to murder someone. A glass is another example as it can 
be used to drink water, or to drink wine with. Similarly, a contract like marriage 
contract can be resorted to by a couple not to realise its many original objectives but 
to only obtain the sexual pleasure for maybe one hour or two, then to immediately 
effect divorce. So used, it becomes a legal trick to avoid zina (adultery). Thus, any 
contract, including a sale contract, can be used not to realise what it has been 
originally designed for, but to obtain some unlawful ends on grounds of its legitimate 
form and structure.  
  
  These two facts, namely the modern Islamic financing instruments being modelled 
after the conventional financing products though the later involves riba, and the 
possible abuse of any contract, must not escape the attention of any researcher or 
scholar trying to examine and determine the legitimacy of the contemporary 
financing contracts as implemented in the Islamic financial institutions.  
  
 For the sake of brevity, our discussion in this paper will be limited to only examining 
the controversial financing instruments as practiced in some Islamic banks and 
financial institutions. As for financing instruments whose legitimacy is in principle 
free from doubt, they are excluded from this study, since there is no conflict between 
their technicalities and Shariah objectives.  
  
 However, it is worth noting before we start our discussion that Islamic banks and 
financial institutions vary in terms of their adoption of the controversial financial 
instruments. This can be attributed to factors like: how committed and learned the 
Shariah board members are; the policy of the institution and the extent of its 
adherence to Shariah; the level of awareness of the public where the Islamic bank 
operates and their ability to evaluate Shariah related matters.  
  
 
2. SHARIAH PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY AND  
PERMISSIBILITY OF CONTRACTS  
  
 The aim of the following discussion is to elucidate the juristic approaches towards 
determining whether a contract is valid and permissible from Shariah perspective.  
  
2.1 Juristic Methodology in Validating Contracts  
  
 When jurists were in the process of deriving from Shariah texts the criterion that 
determines contracts validity, they could identify two categories of texts. The first 
category implies the need to adopt intention of contractors as one of the bases for 
validating their contracts, such as the well known hadith “matters are determined by 
intention” (1F تاينلاب لامعلأا امنإ) 1. This hadith implies that intention, i.e. the purpose or 
substance of the contract, is very basic to accept a contract and rule it as valid; 
therefore, contract’s form or structure alone is not sufficient for ruling it as valid.    
  
 The second category of Shariah texts suggests the opposite; judging all things 
including contracts must be based on their form and structure alone, apart from 
                                                     
1 - This hadith was narrated by Omar bin Al-khattab (ra). See Sahih al-Bokhari, 1/3, hadith 
No (1); Sahih Muslim, 3/1515, hadith No (1907).  
 contractors’ intention and objectives. 2F2 Among these texts is the hadith in which the 
prophet P.B.U.H. says: “I am a human, so I give judgments based on what I hear; 
however, if I happen to make a wrong judgment, my judgment then would not 
legalise the prohibited…”3F3 Based on this text, judging things, including contracts, 
must be on the basis of apparent evidences. This suggests giving no attention or 
consideration to intentions and purposes.  
  
 Finding such apparently-conflicting evidences, jurists justifiably adopted two 
different approaches to validating contracts:  
  
 The first approach, which is adopted by the Hanafi and Shafi’i schools of fiqh 
(Islamic law), states that validity of contracts must be judged by means of their form 
and structure, giving no consideration to contractors’ intentions and real purposes of 
a particular contract; even if the contract was accompanied by some clues that may 
suggest an evil intention of contractors. To this group of jurists, any contract whose 
structure and form comply with Shariah must be judged as valid, unless an unlawful 
objective is stated in the contract or declared by contractors.  
However, this group of jurists does not neglect or overlook the first category of 
hadith as we will explain soon.  
  
 Unlike the first approach, the second approach gives weight and consideration to the 
contractors’ intention or purpose of a specific contract. If the intention has not been 
made clear in the contract, it can be ascertained from any clues or surrounding 
circumstances that may harbour the contract initiation. If the clues suggest an evil or 
unlawful intention, the contract will then be deemed as null and void. Among the 
clues accepted in this regard is the customary unlawful objective of people from a 
specific type of contract. To them, this kind of customary objective is powerful 
enough to invalidate the contract regardless of the real intention of the contractors in 
a particular contract. This approach was adopted by Maliki and Hanbali schools of 
fiqh.4  
  
 After demonstrating an exposition of the two juristic approaches in respect of 
validating contracts, it can be said that practicality and appropriateness tend to be in 
favour of the one that validates contracts on the basis of their form and structures 
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Juzai. Al-Qawanin Al-Fiqhiyyah, p140; Al-Shafi’i, Al-Um, 4/114; Ibn al-Qaiyyem, I’lam 
alMuaqi’een, 3/109-121; Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfah, 2/36.  
 alone, as it is obviously impractical, if not impossible, to ascertain the contractors’ 
intentions in a particular contract. It is true that clues and customary practices may 
help assess the contractors’ intention; however, there is still an avenue for making a 
wrong assessment of the contractors’ intention. Hence, people’s contracts may be 
invalidated due to a wrong assessment, which is an evil in itself.   
  
2.2 Al-Hukum Al-Diani and Al-Hukum Al-Qada’i  
  
 In order to reconcile the conflicting texts pertaining to this issue, proponents of the 
approach that validates contracts on the basis of only their form and structure have 
distinguished between Hukum Diani and Hukum Qada’i in contracts. The former 
represents the validity of the act between God and Man, which is realised upon Man 
having a lawful intention. The later represents the validity of the act between Man 
and Man; in other words, it is concerned with the worldly affairs. This validity is 
realised upon having a sound and defect-free structure. They opined: let us judge 
people’s conducts on the basis of their structure (Hukum Qada’i) and leave the issue 
of intentions and objectives (Hukum Diani) to the AllKnowing, Allah S.W.T. so as 
to avoid the evil of possibly making wrong judgments. However, this does not mean 
that the evil intention of contractors will go unpunished, simply because unlike man-
made laws, Shariah is a religion so that if one could escape a worldly punishment, 
and one did not repent or was not forgiven, definitely one will not escape the 
punishment in the second life.5 Therefore, a valid act from the perspective of Hukum 
Qada’i is in not necessarily valid from the perspective of a Hukum Diani.  
  
 To summarise, Hanafis and Shafi’is, just like the other schools of fiqh (Islamic 
Jurisprudence), believed that validity of all matters, be them devotions or 
transactions, must be originally determined by intention as the hadith clearly 
suggested. However, they found it impractical to determine the validity of 
transactions by means of intention; in addition, they came across other texts that 
suggested that validating worldly actions must be determined by their form only. 
                                                     
5 - Imam Shafi’i says: "We should judge things on the basis of their form, and Allah S.W.T. 
takes care of the unseen (purposes and intentions). One who judges peoples' conducts 
according to his own assessment of their intentions, he will have legalized for himself what 
Allah and Muhammad P.B.U.H. have prohibited, for it is only Allah S.W.T. who knows the 
peoples' real intentions (the unseen), and He will punish or reward them accordingly. Allah 
has commanded people to rely on form in judging each other's conducts. If there existed a 
person with authority to judge people's conducts on the basis of his own assessments of their 
intentions based on certain clues, then he would solely be the prophet P.B.U.H.".  See Al-
Shafi’i, Al-Um, 4/114.  
 Therefore, they said: we limit the functionality of intention to the hukum diani and 
judge things on the basis of their structure and form.6  
  
2.3 Judging a contract as valid does not necessitate its permissibility  
  
 The earlier discussion on determining contracts validity on the basis of their form 
and structure alone, or on the basis of also contractors' intentions and purposes does 
not in any case cover the issue of determining contracts permissibility. Rather, 
according to all schools of fiqh, the well established hadith of role of Intention 
constitutes the basis for determining contracts permissibility. Should it have been 
identifiable and its assessment not possibly resulting in error, intention would have 
been relied on in determining contracts validity too, as it is the case with devotional 
acts for intention is essential for even the very existence of the devotional acts. For 
example, in fasting if a person refrains from eating and drinking from dawn until 
sunset without observing the intention of the legal fasting, he will not be performing 
the legal fasting.  
  
 Therefore, it is a flaw to take a valid contact as necessarily permissible, or to 
attribute such a stand to those jurists who validate contracts on the basis of their 
structure like Hanafis and Shafi’is. Rather, the basis of contract permissibility is 
always and unanimously its purpose and objective.   
  
 Imam Shafi’i says: "We should judge things on the basis of their form, and Allah 
S.W.T. takes care of the unseen (purposes and intentions). One who judges peoples' 
conducts according to his own assessment of their intentions, he will have legalised 
for himself what Allah and Muhammad P.B.U.H. have prohibited, for it is only Allah 
S.W.T. who knows the peoples' real intentions (the unseen), and He will punish or 
reward them accordingly. Allah has commanded people to rely on form in judging 
each other's conducts. If there existed a person with authority to judge people's 
conducts on the basis of his own assessments of their intentions based on certain 
clues, then he would solely be the prophet P.B.U.H.". 7  
  
 Al-Ghazali, another great Shafi’i scholar, also made it clear that ruling something 
as valid is a different issue altogether from ruling it as permissible. 8F8   
  
                                                     
6 - Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfah, 2/36; Ibn Abedeen. Hashiyat (Rad al-Mukhtar ala al-Dur 
alMukhtar) 5/48; Al-Dasuqi, Hashiyah 3/76; Qurafi, Al-Furuq, 3/268; Mohammad Ali, 
Tahzeeb al-Furuq, 3/275; Ibn Juzai. Al-Qawanin Al-Fiqhiyyah, p140; Al-Shafi’i, Al-Um, 
4/114; Ibn al-Qaiyyem, I’lam al-Muaqi’een, 3/109-121.   
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  To summarize, to all jurist, contracts' permissibility is established on contractors' 
intention and objective; if it is to obtain an unlawful end, the contract is then haram. 
If, on the other hand, the intention is to obtain a lawful end, the contract is then 
lawful.  
  
Examples:  
  
 Among the relevant applications of the distinction between a valid contract and a 
permissible contract is bay’ al-eina (buy-back sale), which is a sale that may be 
resorted to for the purpose of circumventing the prohibition of riba by selling a 
commodity on credit then instantly buying it back at a lesser price for cash. 9F9 This 
sale was naturally ruled as valid by Shafi’is, and also by Hanafis in certain cases. 
However, based on the former discussion, ruling this transaction of bay’ al-eina as 
valid does not necessarily imply that it is permissible according to Shafi’is and 
Hanafis; rather, its permissibility is all based on the contractors' objective of this 
transaction; if it is to obtain cash with a hidden payment of interest by means of a 
sale contract, then it is haram (prohibited). If, on the other hand, the objective is to 
genuinely acquire the commodity sold in both sale contracts so that the occurrence 
of the two consecutive sale contracts was not planned for from the beginning, then, 
it is lawful. In fact, this analysis is nothing but a practical implementation of the 
hadith narrated by Omar bin al-Khattab "Matters are determined by intention".  
  
 Another application is a marriage contract; if the couple's intention is to have a 
permanent marriage relationship with all its implications, then this is a permissible 
marriage contract, while if their objective is merely to legalise having sex for 
sometime then to execute divorce afterwards, then it is an impermissible marriage 
contract, and it may be tantamount to zina (adultery) though it may take a perfect 
structure and thus, be ruled as a valid contract due to observing all marriage contract 
requirements.10  
  
2.4 Good intention is not sufficient to legalise a contract  
  
 A financier via eina may not claim having a good intention to legalise his 
transaction, like intending helping those who need cash, not obtaining riba. 
Similarly, a person selling grapes to a wine maker may not claim a neutral intention, 
i.e. normal trade, to legalise his transaction. According to jurists, if the contract 
                                                     
9 -  See details of bay' al-Eina on page (13) of this paper.  
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4/279; Al-Kasani, Badai' Al-Sanai' 5/198-199; Ibn Al-Humam, Fatih Al-Qadeer 6/71.  
 results in evil, like committing riba, then this contract is unlawful regardless of any 
intention that might be claimed to be observed therein. 11  
  
Result  
  
 The foregoing discussion has somehow indicated that in order for the financial 
products to be deemed Shariah compliant, they must be both valid and permissible. 
In other words, their form and substance must comply with Shariah. This result raises 
the question whether the current Islamic banking and finance products are indeed 
following the same principle.  
  
 Below some examples of various forms of controversial Islamic banking products 
are examined to illustrate the problem of failure in distinguishing between a valid 
contract and a permissible one, as well as the problem of the misapplication of 
maqasid al- al-Shariah  (al-Shariah  objectives) in legitimising contracts that 
substantially go against the very spirit and essence of maqasid al- al-Shariah.  
  
3. EXAMINING SOME CONTEMPORARY MODES OF FINANCE IN  
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
  
 Some Islamic financial institutions have practiced some financing modes that meet 
all contractual requirements but breach Shariah  objectives. The following are the 
justifications provided in support of their adoption:  
  
• Realisation of maqasid al-Shariah, which are basically structured on the 
basis of maslaha (public interest).  
• Being in a state of darura (necessity), and darura may render prohibited 
things permissible.  
• The flexible stand attributed to some schools of fiqh towards transactions 
such as Bay’ al-eina and tawarruq, which constitutes the basis of some 
contemporary modes of finance.12  
 Before we subject these justifications to scrutiny, we examine some financing 
modes as adopted by different Islamic financial institutions. However, the last 
justification above has already been discussed, and we reached the conclusion that 
although some jurists validated Bay’ al-eina and its likes, this validity never entails 
the permissibility of these transactions.  
                                                     
11 - Al-Kasani, Badai' Al-Sanai' 5/198-199; Al-Shafi’i, Al-Um, 3/78; Ibn Abedeen. Hashiyat 
(Rad al-Mukhtar ala al-Dur al-Mukhtar) 4/279; Ibn Al-Humam, Fatih Al-Qadeer 6/71.  
12 -See these justifications in Resolutions of the Securities Commission Syriah Advisory 
Council, Malaysia, p. 21-22..  
   
3.1 Eina-based Financing (Back-to-Back Sale)  
  
 Bay’ al-eina as indicated earlier connotes a sale contract whereby a person sells an 
article on credit and then instantly buys it back at a lesser price for cash. Example: 
"A" asks a loan of $10 from B. B, instead of asking for interest on this loan applies 
a contrivance. He sells an article to "A" for $12 on credit and then buys it back from 
him for $10 cash. So, "A" departs having $10 in hand but indebted to B for $12.  
  
 Such mechanism suggests that the article itself is not meant for purchase; rather, it 
is used only as a tool to provide cash. To illustrate, it makes no difference to the one 
seeking finance to conclude the sale contract on a car, a house or anything else. 
Moreover, practically, such a transaction rarely involves actual possession of the 
item sold or official documentation of the contract.   
  
Some examples of eina products  
A. BBA Home Financing  
  
 BBA stands for Bay’ Bithaman Ajil; an Arabic term which means "deferred payment 
sale". Technically, BBA refers to a sale contract practiced mainly in Malaysia 
whereby a person "A" who does not have enough cash to pay the full price of his 
house of choice will pay only around 10% of the full price. In return, "A" gets from 
the seller of the property a ‘Beneficial Ownership’, which is somehow a commitment 
on the part of the owner to conclude the sale upon payment of the balance (90%). 
After paying the 10% and obtaining the Beneficial Ownership, "A" sells the house 
as represented by the Beneficial Ownership to the Islamic bank for a cash price 
equivalent to the outstanding amount (90%) of the house price. So if the total price 
was RM (Malaysian Ringit) 100, 000,  then the selling price between "A" and the 
Islamic bank would be RM 90,000. Afterwards, the Islamic bank immediately sells 
the house, which is represented by the Beneficial Ownership, back to "A" in 
instalments at a mark up, say for RM 130,000 over a period of 5 years.  
  
  The RM 90,000 paid by the Islamic bank as the purchase price will be 
extended to the property developer in conclusion of the sale contract. "A", 
however, remains indebted to the Islamic bank for the RM 130.000; the price in the 
last sale contract.  
  
Resemblance of BBA home financing to Mortgage  
  
 This mode of finance, apart from the technicalities followed therein, is hardly 
differentiated from the conventional mortgage used in home financing. The only 
difference an observer may find is the way cash is advanced from the bank to the 
 client; in the conventional mortgage it is through conventional loan, while in BBA it 
is through Bay’ al-eina. Further examination of BBA contract particulars and terms 
of agreement will even enhance convergence of BBA with Mortgage.13  
  
B. Islamic Overdraft Facility  
  
 Another application of Bay’ al-eina is 'Islamic' Overdraft (OD) Facility14. It operates 
on the concept of Bay’ al-eina though it is marketed using different names – al-
nakad, al-tamwil. The purpose of this overdraft facility is to enable customers to 
draw cash up to a certain limit over their accounts. Conventionally it functions on 
the concept of interest-bearing loans. Since charging interest on loans is prohibited 
in Islam, some Islamic banks have resorted to Bay’ al-eina as a presumably lawful 
alternative. To explain the mechanism, the Islamic bank would execute two 
simultaneous back-to-back sales with different prices; one on cash basis, the other 
on deferred payment terms. The objective of these two sale contracts is to create out 
of the difference between the two prices a debt liability on the part of the customer 
so as to deduct from which charges imposed upon utilizing the overdraft facility. 
Bank charges depend on the amount and frequency of draws.  
  
 So, the question that imposes itself after exposing these two application of eina is 
whether there exist a genuine difference between eina-based financing and 
conventional loans, that is capable of rendering the former a Shariah compliant basis 
for financing.  
  
Shariah appraisal of Bay’ al-eina  
  
 As discussed earlier, while some schools of fiqh determine contracts validity on 
grounds of their form and structure, all schools of fiqh determine contracts 
permissibility on grounds of their objectives and substance.15 Examining Bay’ aleina 
as implemented in some Islamic banks leads to the fact that its purpose is obviously 
to provide clients with cash yet in a securely profitable manner to the bank. 
Therefore, as far as the substance of eina is concerned, this transaction is nothing but 
a camouflaged interest-based loan.  
  
 Has eina been a real sale contract, it would not be free from risks that are normally 
associated with sale contracts; besides, it would then entail a real interest of the client 
                                                     
13 - See for mortgage mechanism: Abozaid Abdulazeeem. Fiqh Al-Riba, p.576.  
14 - A product offered in some Islamic banks in Malaysia.  
15 -Al-Shafi’i. Al-Um, 3/78; Ibn Abedeen. Hashiyat (Rad al-Mukhtar ala al-Dur alMukhtar) 
4/279; Al-Kasani. Badai' Al-Sanai' 5/198-199; Ibn Al-Humam, Fatih Al-Qadeer 6/71; Al-
Bahuti. Kashaf Al-Qina’, 3/186; Ibn Qudamah. Al-Mughni, 4/278-279.  
 in the commodity of sale. However, in eina, the underlying asset subject to the dual 
sale is inconsequential and typically not related to purpose of financing, and it may 
originate from the customer or the bank.   
  
 Moreover, the sequence of contracts in eina is not accidental; rather, it is something 
predetermined in order to reach the end set in advance, i.e. to legalize charging 
clients upon providing them with cash.  
  
 Logically, it makes no sense for the Shariah to prohibit riba then to accept from its 
followers to circumvent such prohibition by some technique like eina. Definitely 
Shariah would then have contradicted itself and acted against its very principles and 
objectives, let alone against logic and sound reason. Thus, Shariah would fail then 
to convince its followers, before outsiders, of its rationality and validity which have 
always been some of its cornerstones in proving and defending its authenticity.   
  
3.2 Tawarruq-based financing  
  
 The meaning of tawarruq is to purchase a commodity from one party on credit then 
sell it immediately to another for cash. Thus, tawarruq shares the same objective of 
eina as both are meant for extending cash money. However, tawarruq remains 
technically distinguished from eina as in the later the commodity is resold to its 
original seller, while in tawarruq it is sold to a third party.  
  
Tawarruq in Islamic banks  
  
 The mechanism of tawarruq which is practiced in some Islamic financial institutions 
is a slightly modified version of the original form of the tawarruq described above. 16 
F
16 In this institutional tawarruq the bank purchases some commodity from the 
market, like metal form London Metal Exchange (LME), and then sells it to the 
customer on Murabahah basis for deferred payment. Subsequently, the bank, as the 
customer’s agent, sells the metal on LME for immediate cash. In result, the bank 
gains Murabahah profit and agency fees, the customer obtains immediate cash and 
remains committed to repay the outstanding debt that he has incurred when acquiring 
the commodity from the bank on Murabahah basis.17  
  
Shariah appraisal of Tawarruq  
  
                                                     
16 -This transaction is mostly practiced in some Islamic banks of Arab Gulf countries.  
17 - See for example mechanism of Tawarruq in Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank.  
  A very limited number of early jurists ruled that tawarruq was allowed; however, 
the tawarruq that was practiced and received somehow some jurists' acceptance is 
different from the modern contrived tawarruq from different aspects.18   
  
 First, the former tawarruq was in most cases free from deliberate contrivance and 
complicity. Its modus operandi was as follows: ‘A’ individual purchases a 
commodity from B on credit. After purchasing and taking possession of the 
commodity from B, A sells it in the market to a third party without B's assistance or 
mediation. Although the purchase of the commodity was for the mere objective of 
selling it in the market at lower price, this transaction had received some jurists' 
acceptance (Hanbalis)19 due to the absence of contrivance and complicity between 
contractors. However, even if there was an element of contrivance between parties, 
then the transaction would be deemed valid by Hanafis and Shafi’i' with all 
differences, of course, between valid and permissible as explained earlier.20  
  
 Second, the views in fiqh literature on tawarruq, even if contrived, are all related to 
individual practices and cases, and they were deemed irregular and dissenting from 
the mainstream juristic view on tawarruq.  
  
 Third, similar practices to tawarruq were sometimes criminalized in the Islamic 
state, and were subject to constant interference and patrol by \Shariah authorities, 
while tawarruq is introduced nowadays as a well-established Islamic banking 
product and as an integral part of the Islamic financial system. 21  
  
 In conclusion, including the tawarruq practiced nowadays by some Islamic financial 
institution under the tawarruq approved by some early jurists is incorrect especially 
that it involves known intensions and complicity.  
  
                                                     
18 - To all jursts, purchase of a commodity then selling it without an intention of sale at the 
time of purchase is not a form of Tawarruq. The mechanism is as follows: An individual 
owns a particular commodity which he has bought for its own sake against spot, deferred 
payment or other means. After sometime he wants to have cash so he sells it in the market 
for immediate cash. If he has acquired it on credit, he remains committed to repay the 
outstanding debt that has been incurred during acquiring the commodity. This kind of 
transaction raises no Shari[ah objection.   
19 - Al-Bahuti. Kashaf Al-Qina’, 3/186; Ibn Qudamah. Al-Mughni, 4/278-279; Ibn 
alQaiyyem. Tahzeeb Al-Sunan, p. 9/253-254.  
20 - Ibn Abedeen. Hashiyat 4/279; Al-Dasuqi, Hashiyah 3/78; Qurafi, Al-Furuq, 3/275; 
Mohammad Ali,Tahzeeb al-Furuq, 3/275; Al-Shafi’i, Al-Um, 3/78; Al-Kasani. Badai' 
AlSanai' 5/198-199; Ibn Al-Humam, Fatih Al-Qadeer 6/71.  
21 - See for some examples Ibn Abedeen. Hashiyat 4/175  
  As a matter of fact, in both eina and tawarruq the bank acts as a financier who makes 
a secured profit from the clients he finances, and not as a real trader who takes market 
risks, though taking market risk is, as commonly known, the line between sale and 
riba, profit and interest. Moreover, in both transactions, eina and tawarruq, bank 
knows that the client has no interest in the commodity but to resell it immediately; 
either to the bank as in eina, or to third party but through Bank's mediation as in 
tawarruq. These facts about eina and tawarruq eliminate real differences between 
the two; and more generally, they eliminate differences between both of them on one 
side and an interest-bearing loan on the other, reducing differences to only 
technicalities followed in the execution of the two. Had eina or tawarruq not been 
haram, it would then be easily and comfortably resorted to by people to circumvent 
the prohibition of riba; anyone wishing to legitimately provide interest-loaded loans 
would simply effect eina or tawarruq with people seeking finance, so riba would be 
'lawfully' practiced. Therefore, claiming the permissibility of such transactions 
contradicts the \Shariah objective meant from the prohibition of riba.  
  
 Furthermore, the absence of substantial differences between eina/tawarruq based 
financing in Islamic banks on one hand, and conventional loans on the other, annuls 
the justification for burdening clients seeking finance from Islamic banks with extra 
costs due to extra procedures. For clients of some Islamic banks accept willingly 
bearing extra cost for cash financing in return for obtaining \Shariah compliant 
products, but ultimately they end up paying the cost of the technicalities followed by 
some Islamic banks to claim legitimacy of their products.   
  
3.3  Al-Rahn Islamic Pawn Broking22  
  
 Al-Rahn (collateral) contract in the \Shariah is meant to be used as a debt security. 
However, in some Islamic banks it is used to generate profit thereof in a transaction 
called Islamic Pawn Broking. In this transaction, the Islamic bank provides its 
customer with so called benevolent loan on condition that the later provides rahn; 
e.g. a valuable jewel to be kept by the bank under its custody as collateral; however, 
the problem arises when the Islamic bank charges this customer for the so called 
safe-keeping of this jewel. Ironically, the fee charged varies with the amount of the 
loan, and it is sometimes equivalent to the market interest rate.  
  
 Should the storage cost be reflective of actual storage costs incurred by the bank, it 
would be then determined by size, weight or some other physical dimension, instead 
of the amount of the loan. This is besides the many Shariah provisions that invalidate 
this transaction, such as the prohibition to combine between a loan contract and any 
commutative contract (contract that involve exchange of two counter values) in order 
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 to block the means to charging interest indirectly through the later, in addition to the 
Shariah provision that expenses of the keeping the collateral must be borne by the 
muratahin (mortgagee).   
  
3.4 The Misguided Justifications  
  
 The proponents of the current controversial practices of Islamic banks and financial 
institutions argue that Islamic banks need to be treated with leniency especially at 
their infancy stage. This is needed in order to facilitate their growth and 
development, and to ensure their sustainability and viability amid the hegemony and 
prevalence of the conventional banks and the interest-based economic systems. 
Otherwise, Islamic banks would be doomed to fail, and their failure is a failure of 
the whole Islamic economic system, which would in turn affect the very project of 
establishing the modern Islamic state. This, to the proponents of such views, 
necessitates a more flexible and liberal approach when structuring Islamic banking 
products in order to meet the Shariah objectives.  
  
 Obviously, from this justification it can be implied that they have based their 
arguments on various Shariah  concepts, the most important of which are Shariah  
objectives (maqasid al-Shariah), maslaha and darura.  
  
 To further address this issue we need to examine these concepts in detail in order to 
have a better understanding on how the justifications of the contemporary 
controversial financial transactions can be refuted.  
  
4. REALISATION OF MAQASID AL-SHARIAH & MASLAHAH  
  
 Maqasid (the plural of maqsad: objective) al- Shariah  are the objectives, spirit and 
the rationale of the Shariah. A comprehensive and careful examination of the Shariah 
rulings entails an understanding that Shariah  aims at protecting and preserving 
public interests (maslahah) in all aspects and segments of life.23  
  
 So, Shariah  laws in general are designed to protect these benefits, and to facilitate 
improvement and perfection of human lives’ conditions on earth. This fact suggests 
that we are required to maintain maqasid al-Shariah when implementing Shariah 
rulings, and to observe these maqasid when deducing rulings for the new arising 
matters.  
  
 Therefore, in the context of Islamic banking, if observing maqasid al-Shariah 
naturally entails observing the rationale and the spirit of the texts, then to observe 
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 only the form and the structure requirements of a transaction while structuring a 
financial banking product functions against the very concept of maqasid alShariah. 
Hence, for a proper realization of maqasid al-Shariah , Islamic banking and finance 
must ensure that all transactions comply with Shariah; not only in terms of legal 
technicalities and forms but more importantly in terms of the economic substance of 
these transactions which is premised on the objectives outline by Shariah.  
  
 Surprisingly enough, maqasid al-Shariah have been used as a justification for 
adoption of some riba -disguised banking products though observing maqasid 
alShariah must be the first factor to determine their prohibition.  
  
4.1 Macro Maqasid versus Micro Maqasid  
  
 One may think that by legalizing some controversial transactions such as Bay’ al-
eina the macro maqasid are observed. What we mean by macro maqasid here is the 
interests or benefits related to the overall well-being and welfare of the economic 
system, which have always been the objectives of Islamic economics; whereas micro 
maqasid only relates to certain micro issues pertaining to certain individual financial 
transactions. Obviously macro maqasid are more important to observe than any 
micro maqasid. These macro maqasid manifest themselves in structuring an Islamic 
economy and pushing it forward to compete with and supersede the conventional 
banks at least in the Muslim countries. On the other hand, maintaining the prohibition 
of certain transactions helps in observing the particular maqasid of certain detailed 
rulings but possibly at the expense of the macro maqasid of Shariah  in a particular 
age, or more specifically, the maqasid of the Islamic law of transactions, since the 
later aims at building a strong and just economic system.  
  
 To address this misconception, we need to highlight a very important issue which is 
the conflict between a perceived maslahah and Shariah texts. In brief, if there 
appears to be a conflict between a perceived maslahah and a Shariah text, then 
Shariah texts must always prevail over the perceived maslahah This is particularly 
true for three reasons: Firstly, the very presumption of the occurrence of a conflict 
between a definitive Shariah text and a real maslahah is false, simply because all 
Shariah texts aim at realisation of maslahah as admitted by proponents of maslahah 
prevalence. Secondly, even if such a conflict hypothetically exists, then it is the 
Shariah texts that must be given priority over the perceived maslahah.  
This is because maslahah itself derives its authority from the Shariah texts and not 
vice versa. Moreover, jurists who stated maslahah as one of the authoritative sources 
of Shariah had qualified this maslahah by being mursala (silent on); i.e. there is no 
textual authority on its validity or otherwise. Therefore, maslahah does not operate 
if found to be in conflict with definite Shariah texts. Thirdly, human perception of 
 maslahah is not necessarily true; human intellect is doomed to err and change its 
perceptions.  
  
 In other words, the determination of maslahah in terms of what is beneficial and 
what is harmful cannot be left to human reasoning alone. Instead, as muslims we 
should put high recognition to what has been prescribed by the Lawgiver in Shariah 
text. This is because the inherent limitations of human beings posit a strong reason 
which requires divine guidance especially to ascertain what is right and what is 
wrong. In this regard, Ibn Taymiah says: “What constitutes a maslahah or a mafsada 
(the opposite of maslahah) is subject to the Shariah standards”24. Al- 
Dahlawi also says: “Our lawgiver is more trustworthy than our reasons”.25  
  
 If there was any kind of maslahah in riba or its sale-based tricks, then the Lawgiver 
would not have considered riba as the worst of evil and one of the gravest sins that 
invoke curse and declaration of war by the Almighty. The Qur’an says: “But God 
has permitted the sale and forbidden the riba” (2:275) and, “God destroys/eliminates 
the riba;” (2:276) and, “O ye who believe, fear God and quit what remains of the 
riba if ye are indeed believers; but if ye do it not, take notice of war from God and 
His Messenger” (2:278-279). As a matter of fact, no other sin is prohibited in the 
Qur’an with a notice of war from God and His Messenger. Obviously, maqasid al-
Shariah have been abused to justify certain financial contracts which in fact 
contradict the Shariah texts and principles.  
  
4.2 Overruling the Prohibited Practices on the Grounds of Darura  
  
 There is a tendency in some Islamic banks today to justify implementing eina and 
its likes, as well as some other controversial practices, on grounds of darura. So, 
what is darura and is it a valid justification?  
  
 Darura means necessity. Unanimously darura renders the prohibited things 
permissible as this constitutes a well-established fiqh maxim in Shariah “Necessities 
permits the forbidden” (Al-Darurat Tubih Al-Mahzurat). However, when jurists 
discussed and explained the applications of this fiqh maxim, they mentioned what is 
known in Arabic as dawabit, which means conditions and guidelines, for the 
functionality of this maxim. These guidelines (dawabit) are of course stated in or 
derived from the Shariah texts. The first guideline (dabit) is: what constitutes a 
darura. The juristic concept of darura can be summarised by saying that darura is 
something which is indispensable for the preservation and protection of the five 
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 essential values: faith, life, intellect, posterity and wealth.26 This means that the 
concept of darura would give the Muslim a legal excuse to commit the forbidden; if 
indispensable for his survival, spiritually and physically.27  
  
 Applying the principle of darura to the case in question would not in any way imply 
rendering the unanimously forbidden transactions to be permissible so as to apply 
them in Islamic banks. If it is presumed that such products are indispensable for the 
Islamic bank’s survival and long-term sustainability due to certain considerations, 
then the argument is that the very concept of the bank itself is not indispensable for 
the Muslim’s survival from the Shariah perspective. If such darura hypothetically 
exists, then it would rather legitimise dealing with conventional banks directly.  
  
 Obviously, when Shariah prohibits something it provides alternatives; when it 
prohibits zina it permits marriage, when it prohibits wine and pork for consumption 
it permits all other sorts of food and drinks. Likewise, when Shariah prohibits certain 
contracts such as contracts based on riba, it alternatively permits many other 
contracts like sale, lease, salam, istisna[, mudarabah and musharakah. To 
economists, such contracts are the better alternatives to riba, and ultimately can yield 
a prosperous and a healthy economy.28 Conversely, an economy based on riba leads 
to disparity and inequality of wealth distribution between rich and poor. If this is the 
case, then where is the darura that may allow Muslim to abandon these beneficial 
contracts in favour of harmful and destructive ones? In fact, legalising a forbidden 
thing on the grounds of darura is supposed to solve a problem not to create a bigger 
one. Surprisingly, Islamic banks have been in the business for more than three 
decades, and they still offer the same excuses of darura and the impracticality or 
impossibility of adopting genuinely lawful business contracts, due to the existence 
of certain obstacles and deterrents. Do these obstacles and hindrances still exist after 
more than three decades of Islamic banking development? Are there any indications 
to suggest a possible change?  
  
 Moreover, it is a well-established ruling that when a person is given the excuse to 
commit the forbidden on the grounds of darura, he can never deny the original ruling 
of its prohibition; i.e., he cannot claim the original permissibility of his commission 
of the forbidden. For example, if a person is excused to seek a ribabased loan due to 
the occurrence of an extreme urgency and the absence of any possible alternative 
source of finance, then under no circumstances can he deny the prohibition of riba 
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 or regard it as permissible. Otherwise, such an act is tantamount to betrayal of God’s 
ruling and kufur since riba impermissibility is definitive. Therefore, even if the 
justification of darura to implement a contract like Bay’ aleina is valid, Islamic 
banks must then acknowledge the original ruling of the contract and not simply alter 
it then attribute it to Shariah.  
  
 Very clearly, the proponents of Bay’ al-eina and its likes, in their endeavour to 
justify  them, have fallen in contradiction when they claimed their original 
permissibility as discussed before, and at the same time used the principle of darura 
to justify them, though using darura conceptually entails their original prohibition.  
  
5. IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTING RIBA-DISGUISED SALES ON 
ISLAMIC BANKING INDUSTRY AND SHARIAH  
  
 In order for Islamic banking industry to survive and maintain its popularity, urgent 
and diligent efforts must be made towards restructuring many of its products. It is 
quite noticeable to observers that as time goes on Islamic banking is slowly making 
more concessions at the expense of Shariah principles, thus bringing this industry 
closer to its conventional counterpart. It is feared that such concessions may 
eventually lead to people losing confidence in Islamic banking, though this 
confidence is its greatest asset giving it a competitive advantage against conventional 
banks. Once this confidence is lost, it is very hard to be restored. Islamic bankers as 
well as Shariah boards should be far-sighted enough not to allow controversial 
practices to bring about the demise of this industry. If the current practices continue 
as such, sooner or later Muslim public will start losing confidence in the Islamic 
banks and their Shariah boards. They will start to question the legitimacy of every 
single product Islamic banks are offering despite any endorsement by Shariah boards 
that these products may have received.   
  
 Therefore, Islamic banking needs to differ significantly from conventional banking, 
not only in the ways of doing business, but above all in the values which guide 
Islamic banking operation and outlook. More importantly, implementing 
controversial transactions has defamed Shariah by transforming some of its rulings 
into a meaningless set of rules that is incapable of convincing Muslims and 
nonMuslims of its rationality and wisdom. Rather, it leaves the public baffled; being 
unable to comprehend why riba or interest is prohibited regardless of how small the 
interest is, while a financing based on Bay’ al-eina/tawarruq which share the same 
economic and social implications is permissible. Why is it forbidden for the Muslims 
to seek a personal financing on basis of interest-bearing loan from a conventional 
bank while it is permissible for him to seek a personal financing from an Islamic 
bank though in the later case, he might end up repaying even more than what he 
repays to the conventional bank.  
   
 There are many state-owned conventional banks that offer businessmen, farmers 
and manufacturers cash at very low interest rate to support development of economy. 
Does it make any sense to claim that such finance is haram while resorting to a 
product like eina or tawarruq as offered by some Islamic banks is halal though their 
clients may end up paying double or triple what they pay to governmental banks.  
  
 Furthermore, non-Muslims who have no knowledge of Shariah might be mistakenly 
thinking that some controversial Islamic banking products described in this paper 
represent the true face of the Shariah. Moreover, they would believe that it is 
sufficient in Islam to change the name of the forbidden contracts and tailor their 
mechanism to make it permissible. Surely, such practices, if continued, may 
indirectly distort the teachings of Islam.  
  
6. CONCLUSION  
  
  After deliberation on the foregoing arguments, we may conclude the following:  
  
• So far, most of efforts to Islamise the banking and financing products have 
been focusing on their forms and technicalities, while the Shariah objectives 
of these transactions are to great extent neglected. This is because the 
economic substance of many products of Islamic banks is hardly 
differentiated from that of conventional banks and financial institutions.   
• Both form as well as the substance of contracts are important and so must be 
in compliance with Shariah. However, substance rather than form is what 
should be more importantly looked into when structuring a financial product. 
Thus, the restricted view of understanding Shariah compliance by merely 
focusing on the legality of contractual forms and technicalities needs to be 
changed. Otherwise, Islamic banks will just appear as an exercise of 
semantics; their functions and operations will become no different from 
conventional banks, except in their use of euphemisms to disguise interest 
and circumvent the many Shariah prohibitions.  
• Islamic banks and financial institutions are facing some ideological and 
conceptual challenges. These challenges emerge from the improper 
understanding of maqasid al- Shariah and the maslahah and darura 
concepts. Failure to understand these concepts and their application to 
modern transactions has led to their abuse, such as using maqasid to justify 
certain contracts which are in fact contradictory to the Shariah texts and 
principles.  
• Circumventing the prohibition of riba by means of Bay’ al-eina or tawarruq 
and their likes is against the very Shariah objectives of riba prohibition. 
Therefore, those who claim the permissibility of such transactions under the 
 pretext of realising maqasid al-Shariah are effectively acting against the true 
spirit of maqasid al-Shariah .   
• Attributing the permissibility of Bay’ al-eina and its likes to the early great 
jurists like Shafi'is is wrong as these jurists ruled the validity and not the 
permissibility of these transactions, for a valid contract is not necessarily 
permissible.  
• As a criterion for distinguishing between a lawful transaction and an 
unlawful one is to examine the economic substance of a given transaction; 
if found to be identical to that of the prohibited transaction, such as a sales 
contract in which the bank or the financier acts as a creditor not as a real 
trader of real property, then this must render the transaction impermissible 
regardless of any legal form it may take, or any name it may be given.  
• Use of dubious financial products may have fatal implications on the Islamic 
banking industry as a whole, since such practices may eventually lead to 
convergence between Islamic banking and conventional banking; confining 
differences only to semantics and technicalities.   
• Claiming Shariah permissibility of the riba-disguised products leads to the 
distortion of the Shariah and harms the image of Islam.  
• In the final analysis, Islamic banks should forgo all the riba-disguised 
products and all controversial contracts that may impede the growth and 
progress of Islamic banking and finance industry. Indeed Islamic banking 
system has the potential to become one of the promising sectors to realize 
the noble objectives of Shariah; however, this requires the internalisation of 
Shariah principles on Islamic financial transactions, in its form, spirit and 
substance. By so doing, it epitomizes the objectives of Shariah in promoting 
economic and social justice.  
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